India-China Face Off, The New Great Game

When the whole world is busy contending with global pandemic of Covid-19, there is in progress a bloody faceoff between the soldiers of the two largest armies of the world in Ladakh: Peoples Liberation Army of China and the Indian Army. Some people call it a boundary dispute of old, which it is. However, it is more than a mere boundary dispute. Major Generals of the two countries have met couple of days ago to sort out the differences. Lieutenant Generals are scheduled to meet on June 6, 2020. However, it is unlikely that this dispute would be resolved soon and at local Commanders levels. At the most they may call it a day for now and resume the game at some time in future, not only in Ladakh but also at other places along the 3488 km Line of Actual Control as so called. Before proceeding further let us trace the roots of the dispute in the distant past.

The Treaty of Amritsar that created Kashmir State did not identify its northern and eastern borders. Raja Gulab Singh who received this State was already Prince of Jammu State which included Ladakh and Baltistan; and Jammu State was itself part of Lahore Sikh State. Kashmir Valley, then, was an administrative Province of Lahore Sikh State. In order to weaken Lahore Sikh State, the British cut off Jammu State and Kashmir Province from it through Articles 4 and 12 of the March 9, 1846, Treaty of Lahore. On March 15, 1846 they raised Raja Gulab Singh to the position of Maharaja in order “to admit him to the privileges of a separate treaty”. Next day, March 16, 1846, they entered into a separate treaty with him called the Treaty of Amritsar, and thereby transferred Kashmir Province and Jammu State into his “independent possession” (independent of Sikhs and not independent of British). Article 1 of the Treaty of Amritsar read: “The British Government transfers and makes over, for ever, in independent possession, to Maharaja Gulab Singh, and the heirs male of his body, all the hilly or mountainous country, situated to the eastward of the river Indus, and westward of river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding Lahol, being part of the territory ceded to the British Government by the Lahore State, according to the provisions of the article 4 of the Treaty of Lahore, dated March 9th, 1846”.

The territories transferred by the British to Gulab Singh included Chamba which is presently part of the Indian Province of Himachal Pradesh; and cis-Indus Hazara which forms part of the KPK Province of Pakistan. Gulab Singh transferred these territories back to the British in 1846 itself. That is a different story.

Now, so far as trans-Indus Gilgit, Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin are concerned, it is debatable whether they were ever part of Kashmir State territories. It is these territories, especially the later (Aksai Chin and thereabouts) that is the cause of present India-China faceoff.

British lacked an idea about what the position was north and east of river Indus. Article 2 of the Treaty of Amritsar therefore stated: “The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to Maharaja Gulab Singh shall be laid down by commissioners appointed by the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively, for that purpose, and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.”

The actual position north of the Indus was that Gilgit proper was ruled on behalf of Lahore State by Sayyid Nathu Shah of Gujranwala, the Punjabi Muslim Commander of Lahore Sikh Forces. Around Gilgit, up to Karakoram mountain ranges, beyond which lay Chinese/Eastern Turkistan, there were independent states of Hunza, Nagar, Punial, Ishkuman, and Yasin. Subsequent to the Treaty and to the forcible occupation, with British assistance, of Kashmir Valley by Gulab Singh in November 1846, Nathu Shah changed allegiance to Maharaja Gulab Singh. So Gilgit also came under his rule despite its exclusion in the Treaty of Amritsar. Of the hill states located north of Gilgit, Hunza was strategically the most important as it commanded Mintaka, Khunjerab, and Shimshal passes which led into Eastern Turkistan. The position in Baltistan and Ladakh was that Gulab Singh already ruled on both sides of the Indus. However, there was no clearly demarcated boundary between Ladakh province of former Jammu State on the one hand and Eastern Turkistan and Tibet on the other hand. In 1852 the people of Gilgit rose in rebellion against Dogra occupation under the command of Gaur Abdur Rehman, Raja of Yasin, and annihilated them to a man. Gilgit was liberated. Gulab Singh did not try to retake Gilgit. His sway now extended up to the eastward side of the river Indus where Bunji became his main army base. Ranbir Singh succeeded his father as Maharaja in February 1857. He wished to set up independent trade relations with Eastern Turkistan and Afghanistan, and to pursue an independent foreign policy. With these designs in view he sent his army across Indus in 1860 to bring Gilgit under his control. Gilgit was the nerve centre of the trans-Indus region from where Chilas, Hunza, and Chitral were accessible. Equipped with modern weaponry and tacit British support, Dogras recaptured Gilgit in 1860.

Across the Karakoram, Muslims of Eastern Turkistan rose up in rebellion in 1861 against Chinese Manchu rulers. They pillaged Chinese populated cities and massacred the Chinese. When this insurrection spread throughout Eastern Turkistan, Buzurg Khan, an adventurer, returned from exile in the Western Turkistan Khanate of Khokand in January 1865 with his protégé Yaqub Beg (p.322 The Great Game Peter Hopkirk). When Buzurg Khan and Yaqub Beg crossed the Pamir mountains (separating Western from Eastern Turkistan) to Kashgar they found it in utter turmoil. The rebels were fighting Chinese and also among themselves. Within two years Yaqub Beg wrested Kashgar and Yarkand from Chinese as well as from the rebels and installed his patron Buzurg Khan as the King of what now came to be called Kashgaria. In 1868 Beg pushed aside his patron Buzurg Khan and crowned himself the King of Kashgaria with Kashgar as its capital. Soon he brought whole of Eastern Turkistan under his firm control (p.322 The Great Game Peter Hopkirk).

Taking advantage of the unrest and political uncertainty in Eastern Turkistan, Maharaja Ranbir Singh dispatched in 1864 a small force across Karakoram Pass sixty miles inside to Shahidullah/Xaidulla located on Leh-Kashgar caravan route(p.22 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy Alastair Lamb; p.203 Maharaja Ranbir Singh Sukhdev Singh Charak). Here they set up a fort on the left bank of river Karakash.

A British surveyor of the time, W. H. Johnson, showed the north-eastern frontier of Kashmir State on official British Indian maps some hundred miles away into the trans-Karakoram region to cover Shahidullah/Xaidulla Dogra garrison. This measure on his part extended Kashmir State by some 21000 square miles of territory including Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin wasteland (p.23 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy Alastair Lamb).

When British authorities in Calcutta came to know about this new development, they were annoyed with Surveyor Johnson as well as with Maharaja Ranbir Singh. They perceived that the Maharaja was playing foul with Treaty of Amritsar and British sovereignty because he had executed independent foreign policy and independent military ventures. Article 4 of the Treaty prevented any change in territorial limits of Gulab Singh’s Kashmir State without British concurrence. So, they made clear to Maharaja Ranbir Singh that they did not accept the new boundary. Also, they placed an Agent, Dr. Henry Caylay, at Leh in 1867 to keep an eye on what was going on across Karakoram.

A British Army Lieutenant of the time, by name Robert Thorp, who visited Kashmir every year to study the pattern of misrule unleashed against hapless Kashmiris by Maharaja Ranbir Singh’s agents, protested through his write-ups that the occupation of Shahedullah(Xaidulla) by Kashmir State Forces was a violation of the Treaty of Amritsar, because the boundary of Kashmir State, according to British perceptions, lied along the Karakoram watershed.

In 1867, Maharaja Ranbir Singh recalled Shahidullah garrison. Later that year, Yaqub Beg’s troops pillaged and destroyed the Shahidullah fort (p. 89 Cashmere Misgovernment Kashmir Papers Robert Thorp).

It seems that there was a nexus between Surveyor Johnson and the Maharaja Ranbir Singh of Kashmir. The Maharaja rewarded Surveyor Johnson in 1872, after he retired from British service, by appointing him Waziri-Wazarat, Governor of Ladakh; but Robert Thorp, who challenged the Maharaja’s claim on the trans-Karakoram region (Shaksgam and Aksai Chin), and proposed to the British Government of India outright annexation of Kashmir State as a punishment, had to suffer assassination in November 1868 allegedly by the Maharaja’s agents.

The seeds of a future dispute had been sown.

After bringing Gilgit under control in 1860, Maharaja’s troops had extended his authority to various Principalities of Gilgit including Chilas, Darel, Nagar, Yasin, Punial, Ishkuman, and Astor. They reduced Hunza, the most important of these Principalities into some sort of tributary relationship with Kashmir State in 1869. Hunza, however, continued its tributary relationship with Eastern Turkistan also because this relationship gave the ruler, Mir of Hunza, cultivation and grazing rights in Raskam across Karakoram.

In 1877 King Yaqub Beg of Kashgaria died. In 1878 Chinese recaptured Kashgar. In 1884 the Chinese empire incorporated Eastern Turkistan as a province of China. They named it Sinkiang (p.22 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy A. Lamb). In the absence of any alternative map, the 1864-Johnson map of eastern Karakoram continued to influence British Indian maps for many years.

Meanwhile across the Pamirs, Russian Tsarist Empire started its advance into Western Turkistan in 1865 by taking first the city of Tashkent which was part of the Khanate of Khokand. In the matter of a decade the Russians subjugated the whole of Western Turkistan ( the Khanates of Khokand, Khiva, and Bukhara) thereby pushing their frontier close to the northern frontiers (Gilgit Area) of British Empire. From British strategic point of view, the British imperial interests in India were now threatened more in Gilgit area than in Ladakh. So, in 1877 they established their Agency at Gilgit, under Major J. Biddulph, for surveillance of the Mintaka, Khunjarab, and Shimshal passes against the incursion of Russian agents. This was part of the Great Game which the British and the Russian agents played to outsmart each other in high Asia. In 1888, Dogra Administration (Pratap Singh assumed power in 1885) put a proposal to India’s British Government to reoccupy Shahidullah post in order to protect the Leh-Kashgar Caravan Route from marauding bands. The plan was rejected because this would result in unnecessary argumentations with the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang. At that point of time the British were more concerned about the Gilgit area (p.26 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy A. Lamb). The plan was rejected again in 1892. In 1899, the British India Government communicated a Note to Chinese Government in Peking on March 14 proposing a boundary line (called Macartney-MacDonald Line) between their respective areas of influence across Karakoram – between Kashmir State on one side and Sinkiang and Tibet on the other side. Tibet was ruled by Dalai Lama under Chinese supremacy. On Ladakh side, the Note proposed a border which put Aksai Chin wasteland on the Chinese side. The border mainly ran along the Karakoram watershed (mountain ridgeline separating waters of two river basins). In the Note, the British proposed to the Chinese government that they should give up their “shadowy claims to suzerainty over the State of Kanjut (Hunza)” and that the British Indian Government will, on behalf of Kanjut (Hunza), give up her claims to cultivation and grazing rights in the Raskam districts across Karakoram (p.37 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy A. Lamb). The Chinese Foreign Office neither rejected nor accepted it.

In 1905, at the orders of Gilgit Agent, the Mir of Hunza stopped the cultivation of Raskam districts. During 1913-14 Simla Conference negotiations between the British, the Tibetan and the Chinese at Simla, the British ploy, according to Alastair Lamb, "was to include in the Simla Conference map an extension of the Tibetan boundary (the Red Line) to the north-west such that it ran along the Kun Lun mountains with Aksai Chin to its south (pp. 41-42 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy)". This would mean a Tibetan Aksai Chin. The Chinese delegate put his signatures on the map but then he was disowned by his own Government in Peking. So, the map lacked any legality. Simultaneous to doctoring with maps the British prompted the Mir of Hunza to resume cultivation in Raskam. In 1936 the British Agent at Gilgit directed the Mir of Hunza to stop payment of annual tribute to Chinese authorities at Kashgar. In exchange for losing his cultivation and grazing rights on the Chinese side of Karakoram the British Agent granted him an annual compensation of 3000 rupees and a fief (jagir) of 312 acres in Gilgit Agency. In all this the Maharaja of Kashmir was never consulted (p.62 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy A. Lamb). During World War II, 1939-45, the British, the Chinese and the Russians became allies against Germany and Japan. It was a time, when, if the British had taken a serious initiative to resolve the border issue with Sinkiang authorities from Gilgit Agency to Ladakh they would have managed to negotiate a permanent border. But they were too busy to address a ‘minor’ issue. As it was, the official British maps of the time did not show any boundary at all in the region between the Kashmir State (which was since ending 1930s also called Jammu and Kashmir State) on one hand and Sinkiang and Tibet on the other. Instead of a boundary, the maps showed a simple word – “undefined”. Partition of British India followed by the partition of the Jammu and Kashmir State created new successors to the British Government of India along the Karakoram frontier – Pakistan in Hunza and (post-Partition) India in Leh. So, the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang would have to negotiate with two mutually hostile countries if they wanted to settle the border issue along the Karakoram. In 1954, New Delhi published a map which showed Aksai Chin inside the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the entire former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir inside (post-Partition) India. Perhaps they had no idea that People’s Republic of China had constructed a highway through Aksai Chin wasteland linking Sinkiang and Tibet. They came to know about the existence of this road when in 1957 a Chinese magazine showed it in a map of the area.

Meanwhile Pakistani President Ayub Khan proposed to Prime Minister Nehru a joint defence mechanism against the rising threat of Maoist China. Nehru rejected Ayub’s proposal with scorn reminding him China-India brotherhood – Hindi and Cheeni were bhai bhai.

In 1959 Nehru wrote on September 26 to Prime Minister Chou Enlai that the British Indian Government’s Note of 1899 described Aksai Chin as part of the former princely State of Jammu and Kashmir (p.72 Kashmir A Disputed Legacy A. Lamb). Thus he “committed” his Government to 1899 Boundary Line that actually had shown Aksai Chin as part of Sinkiang.

Meanwhile China made a claim to Hunza. Reacting to their claim President Ayub of Pakistan warned the Chinese on October 23, 1959 that if they encroached upon Jammu and Kashmir State territory in Hunza they would be expelled with all the force at his command. At the same time, he told them that negotiating a border would be better than imposing one by force. The Chinese promptly responded. Negotiations between the two sides revolved around the 1899 Boundary Line. In 1962, as a prelude to getting the 1899 Line recognized by Pakistan, China invaded India in Ladakh sector to impose a boundary upon India by force. On March 3, 1963, China and Pakistan signed an agreement on boundary issue in accordance with 1899 Line whereof China gave up its claims on Hunza. The Agreement recognizes Pakistan’s right to delimit the boundary to be only provisional. Furthermore, it has a clause that as and when the Kashmir Dispute would be resolved talks on the border issue would be reopened.

India claimed that Pakistan had ceded Shaksgam Valley to China. Pakistan claimed that they did not cede any Kashmir State territory to China. On the contrary China ceded a grazing ground in Raskam across Mintaka Pass to Pakistan for the Hunza cattle to graze upon.

Pakistan had no contiguity to Aksai Chin. So, the question of Pakistan ceding Aksai Chin to China did not arise. Aksai Chin is contiguous to Ladakh which is under Indian control.

In 1984 India captured Sai Chin glacier located beyond the northern most tip of the Line of Control that separates the Indian and Pakistani administered parts of the former Jammu and Kashmir State. Line of Control (LoC) had resulted from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 between Pakistan and India post-Bangladesh War. Previously it was called the Ceasefire Line, about 740 km long, and had been demarcated in 1949, but only up to a certain point beyond which lay the Sai Chin Glacier which was left in 1949 un-demarcated and un-militarized. In 1984 India militarized the Glacier.

India-China Frontier

The frontier between Ladakh and Sinkiang Province of China is called LAC – Line of Actual Control. It is hundreds of km long running north south. In the south the most important point on this Line is Pongong Lake which remains in news because of military face offs. In the north is Daulat Beg Oldi in the vicinity of Sai Chin Glacier. In between are points called Galawan River Valley and Hot Springs, etc.

However, there is nothing “Actual” about the LAC. It is not clearly demarcated. It is based on perceptions. China has its perceptions of the LAC. India has its perception of the LAC. Because of being based on differing perceptions, the LAC area has become a sort of “free for all”. (Somewhat similar is the position along the entire 3488 km LAC from Ladakh in north of India to Arunachal Pradesh in the north-east of India). Therefore, it seems unlikely that China would like to agree to a clearly demarcated boundary line with India because that will put a full stop on its forward moves. China has been for years pursuing a forward policy along the LAC. Moreover, China has committed itself to the recognition of Kashmir Dispute through Article 6 of its 1963 Boundary Agreement with Pakistan; it holds entire former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir as a matter of dispute; it does not recognize Gilgit-Baltistan Province as part of Pakistan; even if it accepts to enter into a boundary agreement with India, it might demand a clause similar to Article 6 of 1963 China Pakistan Boundary Agreement. For these reasons a permanent settlement of boundary in Ladakh (or elsewhere along LAC) seems unlikely.

Since the LAC is located on very high altitude, it remains patrol worthy only from May to September every year. And every year patrol parties clash with each other. India accuses China of “transgressions”. By transgression is meant that Chinese soldiers have crossed to the Indian side of the LAC. Hundreds of transgressions happen every year often resulting in manhandling and stone pelting between soldiers of both countries. No bullets are used though. Bullets are used in Kashmir Valley and along LoC.

This time however, May 2020, the faceoff between the two countries was very serious. China intruded on to the Indian controlled area at three places: Galawan River Valley, Hot Springs, and Pongong.

The immediate provocation as reportedly cited by China is renewed construction of infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, and air strips, by India in the frontier regions of Ladakh. Reportedly China has asked India to demolish the recently constructed bridge called Colonol Chewang Rinchen Setu across Shyok river. Shyok river lies to the west of Galawan River Valley. Shyok Bridge is 255 km from Leh, the capital city of Ladakh. It is a heavy steel work bridge, about 15 feet wide meant to carry heavy military trucks and tanks. This bridge was inaugurated by Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on October 21, 2019, when the patrolling season along the LAC had already ended.

Already India had created in August 2019 a “new normal” in high Asia. It unilaterally abrogated provisions of Article 370 of its Constitution that guaranteed autonomy to J&K State and thereby effected merger of the State with the Union of India. Simultaneously, it abolished the State and reorganised it into two Union Territories (UTs) – the UT of J&K and the UT of Ladakh. Then in November 2019 it published a new political map of Ladakh that stretched from Pakistan administered Gilgit-Baltistan to Aksai Chin. Aksai Chin connects Tibet with Sinkiang. The capital city of Sinkiang called Kashgar is connected to Indian ocean at Gawadar port via the CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor). China has all along considered India to be a threat to CPEC.

Abrogation of the provisions of Article 370 by India and its unilateral merger of former J&K State has changed the dynamics of geopolitics in high Asia. India’s renewed claim on Aksia Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan through the publication of new Ladakh map has raised concerns in China (and also in Pakistan) over the security of CPEC. China is now bent upon pushing India into straits in Ladakh. It wants to capture the triangle of territory flanked on the west by Sai Chin Glacier and on the east by Daulat Beg Oldi – Galawan River axis. This will make Indian position on Sai Chin Glacier untenable. China also wants to capture Pongong Lake area. It also wants to effect forward moves from Galawan River Valley towards Shyok River. Should China succeed, it would be a herculean task for India to defend Ladakh.

In sum the present Ladakh boundary dispute is no longer a question of 1899 Line or 1913-14 Line. It is about changed geopolitical conditions. It is about new Great Game being played out in high Asia. The first principle of Great Grame is, might is right. Might is right in Ladakh, in Kashmir, everywhere.