Why did Pakistan accept talks with India without Hurriyat?

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif met for 160 seconds on November 30, 2015, on the sidelines of Conference of Paris-21. The CoP-21 was held to discuss measures on how to tackle increasing global environmental pollution. This meeting, although brief, paved the way for National Security Advisors of Pakistan and India (Ajit Doval and retired Lt. General Nasser Khan Janjua) to meet on December 6, in Bangkok to discuss a range of issues including peace and security, terrorism, and Kashmir.

The NSA-level talks scheduled earlier this year in New Delhi were cancelled because Pakistani representative (Sartaj Aziz) insisted on meeting Hurriyat leaders. Prior to this, Foreign Secretary-level talks which were scheduled to be held in August 2014, had to be cancelled for the same reason! This time, however, both countries managed to sidestep the Hurriyat leadership by meeting at a neutral venue and away from the glare of the hawkish media.

But why did Pakistan bypass the Hurriyat leadership and engage in talks with India in the Thai capital? Is it a Pakistani tactic to get India on the table for talks on Kashmir? Or, is it a sign that Pakistan has started considering the Hurriyat leadership a liability?

What about India? What is its game plan? Maybe they have begun to understand that their anti-Pakistan rhetoric cost them dear in the Bihar elections of previous month; and that engaging with Pakistan was a better option.

Just one day after the Bangkok meeting of NSAs, the spokesman of the ruling BJP, Dr. Sambit Patra, proceeded to clarify India’s policy visà-vis Pakistan and Kashmir. He said that Kashmir is a bilateral issue and that the policy of the Modi government is not to allow involvement of third party, i.e., Kashmir as represented by Hurriyat, in talks on Kashmir; and that India will retaliate to the maximum possible degree against any action by Pakistan on the LoC (formerly Ceasefire Line). He used a typical propaganda term, “retaliation”. Indians have learnt propaganda lessons from the Zionist State of Israel. Zionists indulge in all sorts of nasty actions against Palestinians in the name of “retaliation” implying thereby that Arabs provoke them.

India uses similar tactics in Kashmir. They describe their shooting sprees on the LoC as “retaliation” meaning thereby that they only react to Pakistan’s violation of 2003 ceasefire. “Violation of ceasefire” is another propaganda term that the Indian side uses.

What actually happens on the LoC is that India indulges in construction of watchtowers and concrete bunkers which is a brazen violation of accepted norms. Both countries are required to raise structures at least 500 metres deep inside the territory under their control. India now and then violates these norms by raising constructions on the LoC. When Pakistanis protest, Indians shoot in return. Sometimes Pakistanis, instead of verbally protesting, indulge in shooting to disrupt the construction work. The Indian propaganda machine, however, gives out a warped version of the story. They say that Pakistan violates ceasefire and India retaliates in equal measure.

Dr. Patra also said that Kashmir issue would be included in any future talks between India and Pakistan. But then the point is what is India’s perception of Kashmir issue? Not the international sovereignty dispute as Kashmiris understand it to be.

According to Maroof Raza, strategic affairs “expert”, who was also present on the Times Now debate with Dr. Patra, there are five aspects of Kashmir issue:

i) infiltration of terrorists from Pakistan across LoC;

ii) tranquillity on LoC (an issue common to both countries);

iii) Siachin glacier;

iv) Pakistan administered Kashmir; and

v) Pakistan occupied Gilgit-Baltistan.

This implies that the Indian administered Kashmir does not fall under the purview of Kashmir dispute; and that the UN has a role to play in Kashmir is beyond imagination.

Given that the official Pakistani position on Kashmir is radically different from that of India, as the former considers the whole princely State of Kashmir as an international sovereignty dispute to be resolved through UN-sponsored plebiscite, Pakistan’s bypassing the Hurriyat, by agreeing to engage in talks in Bangkok, raises questions. Does Pakistan now consider the Hurriyat a liability? If it was a tactic of Pakistan, were they ready to accept India’s perceptions on Kashmir issue as genuine?

Pakistan’s recent behaviour forces one to the conclusion that they have perhaps accepted the thesis of Track II diplomat Dr Happymon Jacob that there are two disputes over Kashmir; one between Pakistan and India, and the second between India and Kashmiris.

If so, then Pakistan would be more than content to get Pervez Musharaf’s Four Point Formula (based on Livingston Proposal) implemented on Kashmir thereby gaining some concessions, such as trade between Rawalpindi and Srinagar; and perhaps also permission to merge Pakistan administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan as autonomous provinces of federation of Pakistan at par with its other provinces.

Inside Kashmir When Track II diplomat, Dr. Happymon Jacob, propounded his thesis of two disputes on Kashmir, the Hurriyat remained silent.

As of now Pakistan seems to have accepted his thesis. Both the Mirwaiz and Geelani factions of Hurriyat seem to be at a loss to understand what to do next. Geelani complained that people have failed the pro-freedom leadership. He said this despite knowing very well that even children, women, and the aged sacrificed their lives. And the Mirwaiz asked the people to suggest some alternative to the politics of “hartal”, the most frequently used (or misused) tool that the Hurriyat wielded.

Naturally some questions arise: Is the Hurriyat losing its relevance? Has the time arrived for the formation of a non-Hurriyat, non-pro-India third front committed to the resolution of Kashmir dispute through peaceful means including the constitutional ones?